SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF HUMAN EMOTIONS

Jonathan H. Turner and Jan E. Stets

Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside, California 92521;
email: jonathan.turner@ucr.edu, jan.stets@ucr.edu

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■ **Abstract**   Over the past three decades, five general theoretical approaches to understanding the dynamics of human emotions have emerged in sociology: dramaturgical theories, symbolic interactionist theories, interaction ritual theories, power and status theories, and exchange theories. We review each of these approaches. Despite the progress made by these theories, several issues remain unresolved: the nature of emotions, feeling, and affect; the degree to which emotions are biologically based or socially constructed; the gap between social psychological theories on emotions and macrostructural theorizing; and the relatively narrow range of emotions theorized, coupled with an equally narrow focus on the structural and cultural conditions producing these emotions.

INTRODUCTION

Aside from Cooley (1964 [1902]), the founding sociologists did not provide many theoretical leads for analyzing emotions, and thus it should not be surprising that the sociology of emotions did not emerge until the last decades of the twentieth century. Despite this late start, however, the study of emotions has accelerated over the past three decades, as can be seen by consulting earlier reviews and compilations of sociological research and theorizing on emotions (e.g., Kemper 1990, Smith-Lovin 1995, Stets 2003, Turner & Stets 2005). Now, it is possible to isolate a set of explicit approaches to understanding human emotions, including dramaturgical, symbolic interactionist, interaction ritual, power and status, and exchange theories of emotional dynamics. In a very real sense, sociology has made up for the lost decades of the twentieth century when very little theoretical and empirical work on emotions was conducted. Indeed, the analysis of emotions can now be seen as one of the cutting edges of theoretical work in sociology. In this review, we first examine the main lines of sociological theorizing, with an eye to extracting the working generalizations that guide research within each theoretical perspective. We then outline some of the problems in current theories. We conclude with some thoughts as to how to build cumulative theory in the sociology of emotions.

FIVE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
HUMAN EMOTIONS

Dramaturgical Theories

Dramaturgical theories emphasize that individuals make dramatic presentations and engage in strategic actions directed by a cultural script. Although the terminology varies among different theorists, the cultural script guiding action includes ideologies, norms and rules, logics, vocabularies, and implicit stocks of knowledge about which feelings should be experienced and expressed in episodes of face-to-face interaction. Actors present self in strategic ways, emitting the emotions that are dictated by emotion ideologies and rules. When necessary, actors draw upon the cultural vocabularies and logics that define how emotions should be expressed. Individuals are, in essence, dramatic actors on a stage playing parts dictated by culture, and, like all theater, they are given some dramatic license in how they play roles, as long as they do not deviate too far from the emotional script provided by culture.

When individuals do break rules of feeling and display, they experience negative emotions, particularly embarrassment and shame (Goffman 1967, Scheff 1988), and they become highly motivated to repair their breach of cultural prescriptions and proscriptions. To avoid breaches, individuals employ the appropriate emotional vocabularies and syntax (Gordon 1989, Rosenberg 1991) to convince both themselves and others that they are indeed abiding by feeling rules and display rules (Hochschild 1979, 1983). Persons also consciously manipulate facial expressions, forms of talk, and gestures to sustain an impression that feeling and display rules are being met. They also use physical props such as clothing or objects on the interpersonal stage to communicate to others that they are adhering to emotion ideologies and norms.

Individuals are not, however, viewed as tightly programmed by culture. Instead, dramaturgical theories all emphasize that persons engage in a considerable amount of expressive manipulation along several fronts. One source of manipulation is to use emotional displays to con others in confidence games of varying magnitude (Goffman 1961, 1967). Another manipulative strategy is to use emotions to gain other resources in microeconomic exchanges. For example, in Clark's (1997) conceptualization of sympathy, individuals offer sympathy to others in exchange for another valued emotional resource, such as gratitude. Clark also points out that actors manipulate emotional displays in games of micropolitics to gain power in an interaction. She argues that the offer of sympathy, for instance, is often used to establish superiority over those who receive sympathy. Virtually all emotions can be strategically used in this manner because individuals have the capacity for expressive control of their emotions, using the display of emotions on stage to gain resource advantages over others. As Goffman (1959, 1967) emphasized, however, when individuals cannot sustain expressive control and violate the cultural script, they lose face and must make ritual apologies that reduce their prestige and power in an encounter.

Dramaturgical theories also emphasize that individuals must manage emotional displays when social structures and the cultural script associated with these structures generate discontinuity between what people feel and what they must express to others in their audience. For instance, Hochschild's (1983, 1990), Thoits's (1990, 1991), and Rosenberg's (1990, 1991) respective approaches all stress that individuals are often caught in a conflict between the emotion ideologies, feeling rules, and display rules on the one side and their actual emotional experiences on the other. When discrepancies between feelings and feeling rules exist, the discrepancy generates a new kind of negative emotional arousal, above and beyond the emotions initially experienced. Thus, a person who feels sad in a situation demanding the expression of happiness may also become angry at having to appear happy, thus ratcheting up the emotional intensity (sadness plus anger) and forcing this person to engage in even more expressive control to meet cultural expectations.

Societies revealing high levels of structural differentiation, high rates of mobility across positions and roles, and mediation of social relations through markets are the most likely to generate discrepancies between actual feelings and the dictates of the emotion culture (Hochschild 1983). For example, market relations between sellers and buyers demand high levels of emotional management from sellers of goods and services; diverse subcultural affiliations can put individuals in cultural conflicts over how to display emotions; complex status-sets can place persons in emotional conflict; systems of authority arouse negative emotions in subordinates that must be controlled; or rigid rules in the name of efficiency and quality control often have the same effect as systems of authority for those who must obey these rules. These and many other situations systematically generated by differentiation and markets require individuals to engage in what Hochschild (1983) terms emotion work. Several theories list the emotion management strategies available to individuals caught in a situation in which they must engage in emotion work. Some of these are listed in Table 1.

In sum, dramaturgical theories emphasize the importance of culture in defining which emotions are to be experienced and expressed in situations. The emotion culture constrains the actions of individuals on a stage in front of audiences, and yet individuals do have some degree of flexibility to engage in strategic actions. In fact, they often use emotionally laden expressive behavior in efforts to manipulate audiences about their sincerity and concern, to extract valued resources in games of microeconomics, or to gain power over others in games of micropolitics. Yet, these same actors are often caught in a conflict between feeling ideologies and rules on the one side and their actual feelings on the other. As a result, they must engage in emotion-work strategies to reduce the degree of discrepancy between feelings and feeling rules. The generalizations that guide dramaturgical theorizing and research can thus be summarized as follows:

1. The more powerful that the emotion culture is in a situation, the more individuals must engage in impression management of their emotions through (*a*) expressive control of face, voice, and body and (*b*) use of physical props.

TABLE 1   Emotion-work strategies

Behavioral strategies
1. Recite emotion vocabulary and syntax dictated by emotion ideology and norms.
2. Engage in body work such as relaxation (or its opposite) that can arouse the emotions dictated by the emotion ideology and norms.
3. Engage in surface acting by emitting expressive gestures consistent with the emotion ideology and norms to arouse culturally appropriate emotions.
4. Use drugs (and other substances) or exercise to generate appropriate feelings or, alternatively, to diminish inappropriate feelings.
5. Release true feelings, even if they violate the dictates of emotion culture, in an effort to redefine the situation and recalibrate the emotion culture.
6. Seek help and advice from others on how to manage emotions.
7. Leave the situation that generates discrepancies between actual feelings and dictates of emotion ideology and norms.

Cognitive strategies
1. Invoke thoughts and ideas associated with the emotions demanded by the emotion ideology and norms.
2. Use meditation or hypnosis that can arouse the emotions dictated by the culture.
3. Arouse through deep acting the emotions dictated by the emotion ideology and norms.
4. Call up thoughts and emotions that distance self from the conflict between the cultural expectations and actual feelings.
5. Repress negative emotions and remove them from conscious reflection.
6. Fantasize about possible alternatives to the conflict between cultural expectations and actual feelings, or, alternatively, visualize solutions to the conflict.
7. Psychologically withdraw from the situation to mask the discrepancies between actual feelings and dictates of emotion ideology and norms.

Sources: Hochschild (1983), Rosenberg (1991), Thoits (1990).

2. The more that individuals engage in impression management of emotions, the greater is (*a*) the potential for strategic use of emotional displays in games of confidence, microeconomics, and micropolitics and (*b*) the potential that individuals' true feelings will be at odds with at least some elements of the emotion culture.

3. The more that efforts of impression management violate the ideology and norms of the emotion culture, the more intense is the arousal of negative emotions in both the offender and the audience, and the more the offender must engage in repair rituals with the audience to reaffirm the emotion culture and his or her commitment to the tenets of this culture.

4. The more that a society is structurally differentiated, has high rates of mobility across structures, and mediates social relations by market forces, the more likely that the demands of the emotion culture will come into conflict with the emotions that individuals actually experience.

5. The more that the dictates of the emotion culture and the structure of a situation conflict with persons' actual feelings, the more likely are individuals to engage in emotion-work strategies enumerated in Table 1.

Symbolic Interactionist Theories

Although dramaturgical theories are primarily concerned with impression management and strategic behavior as individuals seek to give off the appearance of conforming to the cultural script, symbolic interactionist theories see self and identity as the central dynamics behind emotional arousal. Self is more than a dramatic presentation; it is a powerful motive pushing individuals to behave in ways that allow them to verify both trans-situational self-conceptions and situational role identities. Because Mead (1934, 1938) had very little to say about emotions, symbolic interactionists have primarily adopted Mead's pragmatic view that social actors adjust their behavior to make things work in situations. In contemporary terms, using the language of current symbolic interactionist theorists, social actors' behavior is self-directed. Given his analysis of pride and shame as master emotions, Cooley (1964 [1902]) has had a more direct influence on current interaction theorizing on emotions. Also relevant to symbolic interactionists is the Gestalt tradition's emphasis on cognitive consistency and congruence. The above ideas from Mead, Cooley, and Gestalt researchers are blended into a view of self as a cybernetic control system (Powers 1973) that monitors the extent to which self is confirmed by others, with emotions emerging out of this confirmation process (Burke 1991, 1996; Heise 1977, 1979, 1989).

The basic generalization of all symbolic interactionist theories is that individuals seek to confirm their more global self-conceptions as well as their more context-dependent identities in all episodes of interaction. When self is verified by others responding to self in a manner that is consistent with self's own view, the person experiences positive emotions, such as pride and satisfaction. When self is not confirmed, however, the incongruity between self-directed behavior and the responses of others generates negative emotions such as distress, anxiety, anger, shame, and guilt. Individuals are seen as motivated to bring cognitions about self into line with the responses of others and, correspondingly, to turn negative emotions into positive emotions. In Shott's (1979) theory, for example, the arousal of guilt, shame, and embarrassment signals to self that deviations from norms have occurred and that corrective behaviors must be forthcoming. Much theorizing within the symbolic interactionist tradition examines the various strategies that individuals pursue to achieve congruity among self, norms and cultural standards, behavior, and the responses of others. Table 2 outlines some of the potential strategies employed by individuals.

These strategies are part of a larger control system within which self, others, and the situation are embedded. For example, some theories, such as identity control theory (Burke 1991, 1996), view self as composed of multiple identities. For each identity, there is a standard consisting of stored meanings that are used as a frame of reference to regulate behavior. Others evaluate self on the basis of the meanings that the person's behavior implies. If perceptions of self in the situation (given the responses of others) do not correspond to one's identity standard, a discrepancy exists, and negative emotion is felt. In response, self adjusts behavior, modifies how self is perceived by others in the situation, or changes the meaning of self's identity

TABLE 2   Control strategies enumerated by symbolic-interactionist theories

Behavioral strategies
1. Change behavior to obtain confirming responses from others.
2. Seek to convince others to accept behavior and the meaning it implies, and thus confirm self.
3. Withdraw from situations in which self is not confirmed.

Cognitive strategies
1. Change self and identity standards by which self is judged.
2. Move unconfirmed identity down in the hierarchy of prominence or salience.
3. Selectively perceive or interpret gestures of others so as to verify an identity.
4. Repress negative emotions that arise when self is not verified.
5. Make external attributions that blame others, the situation, or social structure for failure to verify self.

Sources: Burke (1991), McCall & Simmons (1978), Scheff (2000), Stryker (2004), Turner (2002).

standard. Conversely, if self has been verified, behavior, self-perceptions, and the identity standard continue uninterrupted, and self experiences positive emotion.

In some variants of symbolic interactionist theories, an identity hierarchy is emphasized. When an identity is verified, it moves up the "salience" (Stryker 1980, 2004) or "prominence" (McCall & Simmons 1978) hierarchy, with identities high in the hierarchy more likely to be presented than those lower in the hierarchy. When individuals receive disconfirming feedback, however, negative emotional arousal pushes them to pursue one or more of the strategies listed in Table 2. When an identity is consistently disconfirmed, it moves down the salience or prominence hierarchy, particularly if an individual cannot leave the situation. Alternatively, a person may change the identity presented or the identity standard by which perceptions of self in the situation are compared (Burke 1991, 1996).

Some symbolic interactionist theories extend the basic argument about control systems beyond a person's cognitions about self to include cognitions about the identities of others, the role behaviors of others, and the setting in which identities are presented and roles played. For example, in affect control theory (Heise 1977, 1979, 1989; Smith-Lovin 1990; Smith-Lovin & Heise 1988), individuals are seen as motivated to keep transient meanings in the situation in line with the more general fundamental meanings about self, other, behavior, and the situation. When fundamental and transient meanings reveal a deflection or contradiction, the emotion that results depends on the transient meaning and its direction of change from the original, fundamental location. For example, if the transient meaning is more positive than the fundamental meaning, individuals feel more positive (for a positive identity) or less negative (for a negative identity) than they would feel if the identity were confirmed. In this way, emotion signals how events in the situation are maintaining (or not maintaining) meanings.

Most symbolic interactionist theories emphasize that these Gestalt dynamics operate to bring identities, cognitions, cultural prescriptions, and social structure

into line. When individuals cannot confirm an identity, they leave the situation, or, if they cannot leave, they change their behaviors, change their self-perceptions, or change their identity to conform to cultural expectations in a situation. Those identities that cannot be verified move down the prominence or salience hierarchy, whereas those identities that are verified move up in the hierarchy (McCall & Simmons 1978, Stryker 1980). As individuals present only those identities that can be confirmed and that conform to cultural expectations, then identities, behavioral outputs, and perceptual inputs become increasingly congruent over time.

More psychoanalytic versions of symbolic interactionist theorizing emphasize that these Gestalt dynamics pushing for congruence among self, behaviors, self-perceptions, social structure, and culture can be interrupted by the activation of defensive behaviors. Individuals can selectively perceive the responses of others; they can selectively interpret these responses; they can make external attributions that blame others for the failure to confirm self or identity; or they can bypass and repress negative emotions, such as shame and guilt, to the point where the individual remains unaware of the negative emotions arising from the failure to verify self or live up to cultural expectations. These more psychoanalytical modes of theorizing (Scheff 1990, 1997; Turner 1999, 2002) emphasize that the arousal of negative emotions, particularly shame and guilt, is highly painful and, hence, is likely to drive individuals to defensive behaviors that interrupt the feedback loop from the responses of others. As a result, cognitions and behaviors are not corrected when encountering negative feedback, leading individuals to engage in pathological behaviors that sustain incongruence among self, behavior, perceptions, social structure, and culture and that can decrease interpersonal attunement among individuals (Scheff 1988). When negative emotions are repressed, they increase in intensity and often become transmuted into new kinds of emotions that further disrupt normal interaction (Turner 2002). For example, in Scheff's (1988) extension of Lewis's (1971) insights, repressed shame often becomes transmuted into anger when it is not acknowledged. In Turner's (2002) theory, repressed shame, guilt, and anxiety lead to sudden spikes of these emotions that break social bonds and breach social situations. Moreover, when individuals repress negative emotions, they are more likely to make external attributions and blame others, the situation, or more inclusive structures for their negative emotional arousal, thereby breaching social bonds and commitments to social situations.

From the perspective of these more psychoanalytic theories, individuals can become locked into cycles of ever-escalating negative emotional arousal, repression, sudden outbursts of intense or transmuted versions of the repressed emotions, shame and guilt for having lost emotional control, more repression of negative emotions, and so on in a cycle that can lead to severe behavioral pathology (Scheff 1988). Moreover, if the structure and culture of a society cause larger segments of a population to repress shame (and perhaps other negative emotions), this population can be mobilized collectively to feel anger and to pursue violence, whether external warfare or internal prosecution of perceived enemies (Scheff 1994, Scheff & Retzinger 1991). These kinds of psychoanalytic additions offer a useful corrective

to the highly cognitive conceptualizations of self and identity in most symbolic interactionist theories.

At the most general level, symbolic interactionist theories (with the exception of affect control theory) are guided by the following generalizations:

1. The more salient an identity is in a situation, the more likely individuals are to emit gestures and behaviors that conform to standards established by this identity.

2. The more an identity is verified by the responses of others, the more likely a person is to experience positive emotions such as pride, happiness, and satisfaction; the more often this identity is verified, the higher it is placed in the prominence or salience hierarchy.

3. The less an identity is verified by the responses of others, the more likely a person is to experience negative emotions such as embarrassment, shame, and guilt; the more intense these negative emotions are, the more this person will attempt to bring into congruence behavior marking an identity, perceptions of others' responses, and cultural standards of evaluation.

4. The more an individual experiences negative emotional arousal from the failure to verify an identity, the greater the likelihood that this person will adopt defensive strategies; the more intense the negative emotions a person experiences, the more likely the person is to employ repression and external attributions as defensive strategies.

5. The more that individuals have employed repression as a defensive strategy in the past, the more likely that the negative emotions aroused and repressed will (*a*) increase in intensity, (*b*) transmute into new kinds of negative emotions like anger, and (*c*) erupt in sudden spikes of negative emotions that disrupt and breach interactions.

6. The more that individuals have been able to verify self and identities in a situation, the more likely that identities, behavioral outputs, perceptual inputs, normative expectations, and sentiments about self, other, roles, and the situation will converge and reveal congruity.

Interaction Ritual Theories

This group of theories draws from Durkheim's (1965 [1912]) secondary analysis of early descriptions of Australian aboriginals who periodically gathered in and around Alice Springs. Such gatherings led to animated and effervescent interaction, a common focus of attention, rhythmic movement of bodies, heightened emotions, and an emerging sense of an external power or mana guiding thoughts and actions. As a result, aborigines developed totems to symbolize this power of the gods; and when rituals were directed at the totems, emotional arousal ensued. Religion was thus the worship of the collective organization among individuals. Goffman (1959, 1967) was the first sociologist to recognize that the elements of Durkheim's

analysis operate each and every time individuals interact in face-to-face encounters. Collins (1975, 1981, 2004) borrows from both Durkheim and Goffman to forge a more robust theory that seeks to explain the arousal of positive and negative emotional energy.

Collins (2004) distinguishes between two types of rituals: (*a*) polite and transient rituals such as greetings that arouse low-intensity positive emotional energy, and (*b*) more enduring emotions that develop from copresence, mutual awareness and attention, a common focus, a shared emotional mood, rhythmic synchronization of conversation and bodies, a representation of the focus and mood with symbols, and a sense of moral righteousness. In essence, Collins views what Goffman (1961, 1967) had termed "the encounter" as a more inclusive interaction ritual revealing the elements enumerated by Durkheim. In such interaction rituals, emotional energy is built upon and is sustained across encounters that are strung together in time and space. In fact, Collins (1981) goes so far as to view such emotionally charged rituals as the microfoundations of macrostructures.

For interaction rituals to increase positive emotional energy, they must activate all the key elements: first, the gathering of individuals in proximate space; next, the emission of stereotyped greeting rituals that raise the level of transient emotions that, in turn, increase the shared mood and focus of attention; then, the ensuing rhythmic synchronization of talk and bodies that increases collective effervescence, followed by rising levels of positive emotional energy. As positive emotional energy escalates, group solidarity increases, leading to symbolization of this solidarity, and with group symbols, particularized cultural capital consisting of the experiences of members in the group increases. Once symbols are built up, conversations or even thoughts reinvoke the symbols and, as a result, charge up the positive emotional energy. Conversely, when this sequence of ritual elements breaks down during the interaction, individuals experience much lower levels of positive emotional energy. In fact, the level of emotional energy can turn negative and reduce group solidarity.

There is the assumption in interaction ritual theory that individuals always seek to maximize their emotional energy in an encounter and that they try to increase their stores of cultural capital that can either be particularized or unique to particular groups, or be generalized or acknowledged and understood by all in a society. However, the capacity to increase positive emotional energy and augment cultural capital is mediated by power and status. Those with power and prestige are able to increase their positive emotional energy and reveal more commitment to group symbols and thus augment their cultural capital, whereas those with less power must give deference and, as a consequence, experience less positive and perhaps even negative emotional energy, leading to much less commitment to group symbols.

A more recent extension of Collins's theory by Summers-Effler (2002) tries to account for the fact that individuals are often trapped in interaction rituals in which they have little power and in which, as a result, they experience negative emotional energy, such as fear, anxiety, shame, and guilt. Under these conditions, individuals

adopt strategies revolving around minimizing the loss of emotional energy rather than maximizing positive emotional energy. Another extension by Summers-Effler (2004a,b) attempts to introduce elements of symbolic interactionism by arguing for the relevance of self as a critical element in rituals. When individuals experience positive emotional energy, their sense of self is enhanced, making them more likely to commit to group symbols. When they experience negative emotional energy, self-esteem is lowered, which results in diminished commitment to group symbols and in lowered levels of solidarity.

In sum, the Durkheim-Goffman lineage has inspired not only dramaturgical theorizing on emotions, but also a distinctive form of interaction ritual theory. The guiding generalizations from this latter approach include the following:

1. The more that individuals are copresent and exchange greeting rituals, the more likely they will experience mild transient emotions, shared mood, and mutual focus of attention.

2. The more that the conditions in item 1, above, persist, the more likely that talk and bodily gestures will fall into rhythmic synchronization, leading to a sense of collective effervescence that increases each participant's level of positive emotional energy.

3. The higher the level of emotional effervescence and the longer its duration, the greater will be the sense of group solidarity among participants and the more likely they will symbolize the emerging sense of solidarity.

4. The more an interaction ritual leads to the symbolization of solidarity and the more this ritual is iterated over time, the more likely that symbols marking group solidarity will circulate among group members and increase the level of particularized cultural capital in the group.

5. The more the conditions above are realized, the more likely that individuals in the group will have conversations among themselves that invoke group symbols and, thereby, arouse positive emotional energy.

6. The more that status and power differences prevail among participants in an interaction ritual, the greater high-status and high-power individuals' emotional energy will be compared to that of low-status and low-power individuals and the more likely high-status and high-power individuals will develop commitments to group symbols and, thereby, augment their level of particularized cultural capital compared to low-status and low-power participants.

7. The more that power and status are used in abusive and exploitive ways, the more those subject to such abuse will adopt strategies of minimizing the loss of positive emotional energy or, alternatively, minimizing the arousal of negative emotional energy.

8. The more salient that self and identity dynamics are during an interaction ritual, the more intense all elements of the interaction ritual will become, with confirmation of self and identity during the course of the ritual raising

the level of positive emotional energy and failure to verify self lowering the level of emotional energy or turning the valence of emotions toward the negative pole.

Power and Status Theories

Like interaction ritual theory, a number of diverse theories have explicitly sought to document the effects of power (authority) and status (prestige/honor) on the arousal of emotions. Kemper (1978, 1984) was the first to present a full theory on the dynamics of power and status (defined as prestige). Later, Kemper & Collins (1990) extended the theory to document the effects of (*a*) relative power and prestige of individuals, (*b*) changes in relative power and status, and (*c*) expectation states for power and status on emotional arousal.

The basic generalization in this theory is that when individuals have power or gain power, they experience satisfaction, confidence, and security, whereas when they lose power, they experience anxiety, fear, and loss of confidence. Kemper and Collins incorporate the notion of expectation states into this model, arguing that when individuals expect to gain power, but in fact do not, they lose self-confidence and experience fear and anxiety. Conversely, when they do not expect to gain power but actually increase their power, they experience satisfaction and gain in self-confidence. When individuals experience gains in prestige (or the receipt of deference), satisfaction and well-being are aroused, and they express positive sentiments to others, thereby increasing the flow of positive emotions and bonds of solidarity between givers and receivers of deference.

When individuals lose status, the dynamics become more complicated because the emotions experienced and expressed depend on the attributions made. When individuals see themselves as responsible for the loss of status, they experience shame and embarrassment, and when the loss is great, they feel sad and become depressed. When individuals blame others for their loss of status, they become angry and shift into an aggressive power mode and seek to force others to honor their claims to status (Kemper & Collins 1990). Expectations add more emotional fuel to these dynamics. If individuals had expected to receive or gain status and blame themselves for the failure to do so, they feel more intense shame and sadness. If they blame others for this failure, they experience higher levels of anger. If, however, persons had expected no gain or even a loss of prestige, but in fact receive more deference than expected, they feel satisfaction and are more likely to express positive sentiments to those who have given them status.

The theory also presents propositions on the emotional reaction of individuals who give, or fail to give, status to others. When status is deserved by another, but not given by a person, the latter experiences shame and guilt. When status is deserved and given without compulsion, the giver of status feels satisfaction, whereas the recipient experiences appreciation and gratitude that, in turn, makes the giver of deference feel even more satisfied.

There have been creative extensions of Kemper's theory; the most important is Thamm's (1992, 2004a,b) effort to specify in more detail the generic structural

conditions that produce specific emotional responses. For Thamm, different emotions are aroused depending on the extensiveness of appraisals by an individual. Each individual has four potential types of appraisals: (*a*) self meets or fails to meet expectations, (*b*) self receives or fails to receive rewards, (*c*) other(s) in the situation meet expectations or fail to do so, and (*d*) other(s) receive or do not receive rewards. Specific emotions emerge depending on the particular configuration of appraisals that a person makes for these four possibilities. For example, if a person only assesses whether other meets or fails to meet expectations, this individual will be pleased and happy when other meets expectations, whereas if other does not meet expectations, the person will be unhappy or disappointed. If more intense emotions are aroused, the individual will be proud of other when expectations are realized and, conversely, ashamed of other if the latter does not meet expectations.

Following Kemper, Thamm introduces power and status variables to his conceptualization. Power is the ability to receive rewards without meeting expectations, and status is the capacity to meet expectations, do something positive, and thereby receive rewards. A lack of power and a lack of status are, respectively, meeting expectations but not receiving rewards and not meeting expectations, doing something negative, and thus not receiving rewards. By carefully working through the combinations of the four structural conditions and the various degrees of power (powerlessness) and status (statuslessness), Thamm is able to create a periodic table of emotional responses that predicts which particular emotions emerge depending on appraisals of self and/or other with respect to expectations and/or rewards and the degree of power and status (and powerlessness and statuslessness). Of all the theories reviewed in this essay, Thamm offers the most predictions about the specific emotions that will be aroused under varying social structural conditions of power/status and appraisal.

In both Kemper's and Thamm's power-status theories, expectations (for gains or losses of power and status) are central to making predictions about the particular emotions that will be experienced by individuals. In expectation states theorizing, this variable is at the heart of all theorizing (Berger 1988). Expectations about the characteristics of individuals and their performance capacities arise in all interactions, particularly in task groups. Those who are competent are given power and prestige, whereas those who are less competent receive lower levels of power and prestige. Individuals bring with them into groups diffuse status characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, and age that are differentially evaluated in the broader culture and, like all status characteristics, establish expectations for performance in groups. Higher-ranking persons in groups are expected to have greater competence than lower-ranking members, and these expectation states allow them to initiate interaction with others, tell others what to do (power/authority), and receive deference from others (status). Emotional dynamics thus revolve around the extent to which individuals meet expectation states associated with their rank in the group and the degree to which individuals accept as legitimate the ranks, associated expectation states, and resulting behaviors of people at different ranks. Several theories of emotions can be found within this theoretical and research tradition.

One preliminary theory by Berger (1988), who founded the expectation states theoretical tradition in the late 1950s, emphasizes that affect expectation states generally arise when individuals interact. If these sentiments persist across iterated interactions, they become more permanent expectation states for the emotions that will be experienced and expressed, now and in the future. Moreover, affect expectations for individuals in a group are translated into perceptions of their personality that, in turn, establish another series of emotion expectation states for each person in an interaction.

One debate within the expectation states literature on emotions follows from Berger's emphasis on emotion expectation states. This debate revolves around the extent to which emotions exert an independent effect on expectation states, above and beyond the effects of power and prestige. Some researchers, such as Shelly (1993, 2001, 2004), view sentiments (mild feelings such as liking or disliking) as an independent influence on expectation states and behavior in groups. When the status (power and prestige) and sentiments (mild emotions) are congruent, they both exert an independent effect on expectation states and behavior, and behavior reinforces all expectation states. When, however, sentiments and status are incompatible, for example, a high-status person is disliked, status generally trumps sentiments and, hence, has greater influence on expectations and behavior. In contrast to Shelly's model is one that sees sentiments as mediating between status expectations on the one side and behavior on the other (Bianchi 2004, Driskell & Webster 1997). In this model, sentiments are viewed as arising from expectations associated with status, adding extra (but not independent) force to expectation states and behaviors, with behaviors reinforcing sentiments and with sentiments reinforcing status distinctions. For example, high-status actors are expected to contribute more in a group and to receive greater deference from others, and when high-status actors also are liked, they receive even greater deference from others.

Another theory by Ridgeway (1994), sometimes in collaboration with Johnson (1990), blends expectation states theory with elements of dramaturgical theorizing. All situations have blueprint rules for the kinds of sentiments that should and should not be experienced and expressed in situations. These rules, coupled with the expectation states that naturally arise in groups, constrain the flow of emotions. Of particular importance in this theory is the emotional reaction to disagreements that arise in task groups, with the nature of the emotions aroused being a function of the relative status of the individuals involved and the attributions made by individuals over the cause of the disagreement. If an individual is at the same or higher rank than another with whom a disagreement arises, the individual generally makes an external attribution and reveals mild anger (annoyance) toward the other. If the individual is of lower status than the other, then sadness and, potentially, depression are likely to be experienced. Because there are different expectations for higher- and lower-status individuals, higher-status individuals are expected to be more competent and, hence, correct when disagreements emerge. Lower-status individuals generally support these expectations and often sanction fellow lower-status members who challenge the expectation states governing those in high and low status.

In contrast to disagreements, agreements among members possessing different levels of status increase the flow of positive emotions among group members, with higher-status individuals experiencing mild forms of happiness such as satisfaction and, as an outcome, expressing positive sentiments to lower-status group members (Ridgeway 1994). When individuals are of equal status, pleasure and gratitude are experienced and expressed when agreement on task activities occurs. The positive emotions flowing from agreements generally bias group decision making toward agreements rather than disagreements because positive emotions are more rewarding than negative emotions. As agreements emerge, they add emotional expectation states to how individuals with varying degrees of status should behave. Agreements and the emotion expectation states that they generate reinforce general expectation states because, under conditions of positive emotions in the group, lower-status individuals see higher-status individuals as more competent, and as a result lower-status individuals are more likely to accept the latter's decisions, thus reinforcing and perhaps escalating the differential expectations for higher- and lower-status individuals.

Lovaglia's and Houser's theory adds some additional dynamics to the expectation state approach (Houser & Lovaglia 2002, Lovaglia & Houser 1996). When higher-status individuals experience the positive emotions compatible with their status, they express positive emotions to lower-status persons and often allow them to have more influence in the group, thus reducing the gap between higher- and lower-ranking individuals. In contrast, lower-status persons, who generally experience more negative emotions than higher-status individuals, often act to reduce the status of higher-ranking individuals by evaluating them negatively and providing fewer opportunities for higher-status persons to exert their rank, thereby lowering the status of the higher-ranking person and reducing status differences.

Lovaglia and Houser also introduce an attribution dynamic to these processes. When higher-ranking group members see their own ability as responsible for their rank, they experience status-compatible emotions such as satisfaction and pride and are thus less resistant to the influence of lower-ranking individuals, thereby lowering status differences and increasing group solidarity. When, however, higher-status individuals make an external attribution and see their rank as the result of luck or external forces, they experience status-incompatible emotions such as anxiety, guilt, and fear, while becoming defensive and resisting influence by lower-ranking persons, thus sustaining the status gap and reducing group solidarity. Attribution processes also operate on lower-status group members. When lower-ranking persons see their rank as the result of their own actions (internal attribution), they accept their rank, free ride off the group's success, and thus sustain the gap between high- and low-ranking persons that, in turn, lowers group solidarity. When they make external attributions and see their rank as the result of external forces beyond their control, they perceive their lower rank to be improper, experience emotions such as anger and resentment, challenge high-ranking members, and thereby reduce the gap between ranks, with the result that group solidarity increases.

Most power and status theories are decidedly micro in their focus on the relations among power, prestige, and emotions. Relatively few of these theories are macrolevel, focusing on the emotions among larger subpopulations in a more inclusive societal system. Among the very few macrostructural theories of emotions is Barbalet's (1998) analysis of how emotions such as confidence, resentment, shame, vengefulness, and fear can be differentially distributed across segments of a population that possess varying levels of power and prestige. In many ways, this approach harkens back to Marx's views of stratification as generating negative emotional arousal and to more recent theories of collective behavior and social movements.

For Barbalet, when changes occur in social structures, individuals react emotionally and collectively to their new circumstances, especially the redistribution of valued resources such as power, honor, and material well-being. When they perceive that others have gained power and other resources in violation of norms and cultural beliefs, they experience resentment, sometimes consciously but often subliminally, and resentment increases dramatically when one subpopulation sees others as gaining at its expense. The highs and lows of the general business cycle, which always change the distribution of resources, are one force behind the resentment that emerges in those sectors of the society that lose resources. When those who have lost resources are aware of their resentment, they often organize collectively to seek redistribution, but when resentment is partially repressed and sublimated, individuals are more likely to engage in deviant behavior.

Fear is another emotion that can be differentially distributed. When individuals perceive that they lack the power to pursue their interests or that other segments of society are too powerful for them to realize their interests, they experience fear, and, depending on how they attribute their lack of power, this fear leads to either a flight or fight response. If segments of a population see their lack of power as the result of their own failings and incapacities, fear leads to withdrawal and flight responses, whereas when other segments of the population are perceived to be responsible for their lack of power, fear turns to anger, aggression, and fight responses.

Other negative emotions like vengefulness arise when segments of a population perceive that those with power have infringed upon their basic right to form meaningful social relationships of cooperation with others. Like negative emotions, more positive emotions such as confidence can also be differentially distributed across macrostructures. Confidence arises when segments of the population perceive that their future is predicable and under control; generally, this emotion is distributed among those with power and material resources.

With a few exceptions, like Barbalet's analysis, power and status theories of emotions remain micro in focus, although perhaps generalizations about interpersonal processes revolving around power, status, expectations, and attributions could be extended to more macrostructural dynamics affecting emotional arousal of subpopulations and collective actors. The current theories do converge on some basic generalizations:

1. The more unequal the distribution of power (authority), status (prestige), and material well-being (money), the more likely that this distribution will generate expectations and beliefs about the competence and abilities of those at different ranks in this distribution.

2. The more that individuals interact, the more likely that emotion expectation states will emerge; the more congruent that these emotion expectation states are with expectations states arising from the distribution of power and prestige, the more compelling all expectation states will be on individuals.

3. Conversely, the less congruent that emotion expectation states are with those arising from differences in power and prestige (and money), the greater the effect of status (power and prestige) will be over emotion expectation states on behavior.

4. The more that expectation states associated with diffuse status characteristics become part of generalized beliefs about the respective qualities of individuals, the greater the power of expectation states will be on behavior and emotions.

5. The more that individuals and collective actors hold power, prestige, and other resources or gain these resources, the more likely they are to experience such positive emotions as satisfaction, happiness, pride, well-being, and confidence and the more likely they are to give off positive emotions to others.

6. The less that individuals and collective actors hold power, prestige, and other resources or fail to gain these resources, the more likely they are to experience such negative emotions as anger, anxiety, sadness, and fear; these emotions will increase in intensity when (*a*) actors do not receive resources that are consistent with, and proportionate to, expectation states and status beliefs, or (*b*) actors do not receive resources in proportion to their status and power.

7. The more that individuals make attributions to self for the failure to receive resources, the more likely they are to experience emotions like sadness and, if resources were expected, shame, embarrassment, guilt, and depression.

8. The more that individuals fail to give deference and compliance to others when they are due, the more likely the individuals are to feel guilt and shame, and the more likely those who are deserving of deference and compliance are to experience anger and fear.

9. The more that individuals make external attributions for their failure to receive resources that were expected, the more likely they are to experience and express anger at those who are perceived to be responsible for their failure.

10. The more that individuals receive resources that others perceive as their due, the greater the latter's resentment will be of the former and the more intense this resentment will be when individuals receiving rewards have not met expectations.

Exchange Theories

All exchange theories view humans as motivated to receive rewards or utilities
and avoid costs and punishments. Although the vocabularies of exchange theories
vary somewhat, the basic model is that individuals incur costs (giving up resources
or forgoing alternative sources of resources) and make investments (accumulated
costs) in order to receive resources from other actors. Individuals behave in this
way to receive a profit (resources received, less costs and investments). Moreover,
payoffs are assessed against normative standards of justice and fair exchange that
can be determined by such factors as comparison of one's payoffs and costs relative
to those of others, previous payoff schedules, expectations for payoff as dictated
by norms or past exchanges, and the relative power of exchange partners.

The basic generalization in exchange theorizing on emotions is that individuals
experience positive emotions when payoffs exceed costs and investments while
meeting standards of justice. Conversely, when payoffs do not exceed costs and in-
vestments and fall below standards of what is considered fair and just, individuals
experience negative emotions. The nature and intensity of the emotions experi-
enced by individuals vary with a number of conditions: the type of exchange, the
types of structures in which exchanges of resources occur, the relative power and
dependence of actors on each other for resources, the expectations for resources,
the standards of justice that apply to the exchange, and the attributions that ac-
tors make for success or failure in receiving profitable payoffs. We review each of
these conditions below and discuss how exchange theorists develop generalizations
about the arousal of emotions.

Exchanges can be of four basic types: (*a*) productive when individuals must co-
ordinate their behaviors to receive payoffs; (*b*) negotiated when individuals actively
bargain over time with offers and counteroffers to establish what resources must
be given up in order to receive other resources; (*c*) reciprocal when one party gives
resources to another with the implicit expectation that this gift of resources will
be reciprocated by the recipient at a subsequent point in time; and (*d*) generalized
when individuals do not directly exchange resources and instead pass resources on
to actors who, in turn, pass them along in chains of exchange that eventually work
their way back to an individual (Lawler 2001). Lawler has argued that productive
exchanges that occur when individuals must cooperate and cannot fully separate
their respective contributions generate more intense emotions, whether positive
or negative, than the other forms of exchange. Negotiated exchanges generate the
next most emotional arousal, although Molm (1997) has argued that built in to ne-
gotiated exchanges are conflict dynamics (offers and counteroffers) that increase
the negative emotional flow in the exchange, at least up to the point when actors
receive payoffs that are acceptable to them. Indeed, negotiated exchanges are often
closed in highly ritualized ways to restart the flow of positive affect that can miti-
gate the tension and conflict arising from active bargaining. Reciprocal exchanges
generate the next most intense emotions, whether positive when gifts are recipro-
cated or negative when gifts are not reciprocated. Generalized exchanges arouse
the least emotion because actors only indirectly exchange with each other.

Lawler argues that the key force behind this differential capacity of varying types of exchanges to arouse emotions is related to the nonseparability of actors engaged in exchange. When nonseparability is high, as in all productive exchange, actors must coordinate their efforts to receive payoffs, and they cannot easily determine their relative contributions. The result is that emotional reactions are more intense, whether in a positive or negative direction. Rational choice theories conceptualize this variable somewhat differently, viewing dependence on the group as generating private joint goods that add a new resource—the effect that comes with face-to-face interaction—which thereby increases the flow of positive emotions (Hechter 1987). Negotiated exchanges reveal only a medium level of nonseparability, and so the emotional stakes are somewhat lower than is the case with productive exchanges. Reciprocal exchanges involve even more separability because of the time lag between the giving and receiving of resources. And generalized exchanges separate the giving and receiving of resources in protracted chains of resource flows.

Exchanges occur within different types of structures. One point of variability is the degree of close coordination of behaviors among individuals to receive payoffs (i.e., what Lawler calls productive exchange). Thus, as noted above, the more that exchanges involve close coordination, the more intense are the emotions aroused. Another related variation is the nature of the networks within which an exchange occurs. Positively connected networks, in which exchanges between any two partners increase the likelihood that they will exchange with others in the network, also increase the movement of positive emotions through the network. Density of networks also increases the flow of emotions, whether through the effect of positive connections among actors or coordination of their activities to receive payoffs. Markovsky & Lawler (1994) have proposed that this effect of networks is the result of reachability among actors in a network and the tendency of actors to overgeneralize from positive exchanges at one point in the network to the expectations for positive exchanges with others in the network who are reachable. Conversely, negative payoffs for actors in a network reduce positive connections and density, thereby undermining the effects of these structural variables on emotional arousal.

The relative power of actors in an exchange is another structural condition influencing emotional arousal. For Emerson (1962), the power of actor A over B is a function of the dependence of actor B on actor A for resources, with dependence of B increasing (1) the more A is the only source of resources for B, (2) the more B cannot do without the resources possessed by A, (3) the more A has alternatives for the resources provided by B, and (4) the less B can coerce A. High total power exists in an exchange when A and B are equally dependent on each other for resources; under these conditions, they have frequent exchanges that arouse positive emotions (Lawler & Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998; Thye et al. 2002). Even when there is inequality in the relative power, frequent exchanges increase commitments to exchange partners (Cook & Emerson 1978). One mechanism by which frequent exchanges under varying degrees of relative power increase commitment is reminiscent of Durkheim's (1965 [1912]) analysis of religious rites and Collins's

(2004) interaction ritual theory. Frequent exchanges in which individuals receive expected payoffs generate positive emotions like pleasure, satisfaction, interest, and excitement that become objectified and, thereby, symbolized in ways that increase the positive emotional flow (Lawler & Yoon 1993). Another mechanism is commitment to an exchange relationship, even under conditions of inequality in which dependent actors may receive suboptimal payoffs. Commitment to an exchange reduces such negative emotions as fear and anxiety that come with uncertainty over payoffs for both the dependent and powerful actors, and in so doing, commitments reduce the emotional costs and thereby raise profits in the exchange (Kollock 1994).

Expectations also influence the level of emotional arousal. The higher individuals' expectations for payoffs and the more payoffs fall below this expectation state, the more intense are negative emotions like anger, fear, and frustration. Conversely, when payoffs meet expectations, individuals experience positive emotions like satisfaction. Expectation states come from a variety of sources, including past experience in a given exchange, standards of justice and fair exchange, and comparison levels. The key point is that, whatever their origin, expectation states create the potential for more intense emotional reactions because even profitable payoffs that fall below expectations generate negative emotions. Conversely, payoffs that exceed expectations lead to additional positive emotions, although justice norms can reduce this positive affect if payoffs exceed by too far the justice standards of equity (that is, payoffs should be proportionate to costs and investments relative to the costs and investments of others).

Norms of justice not only establish expectations for fair payoffs, but they also operate independently of emotional arousal. There is a somewhat ambiguous empirical literature on which rules are employed by individuals in determining justice in exchanges—for example, equity, equality, or procedure—but the data appear to fall toward equity, whereby individuals define as just payoffs that are proportionate to their costs and investments. Even when procedures for allocating payoffs are perceived as unfair, the exchange is viewed as just if equity standards have been met. Homans's (1961) original formulation of the law of distributive justice argued that individuals calculate their payoffs relative not only to their costs and investments but also to the costs, investments, and payoffs of others. If payoffs correspond to the person's and others' relative costs and investments, distributive justice prevails, and individuals experience positive emotions. If, however, the payoffs to self do not correspond to costs and investments, or if others receive rewards without incurring sufficient costs and investments, a person experiences a sense of injustice and becomes angry. Later, Homans (1974) abandoned this idea and articulated the aggression-approval proposition that emphasizes expectation states: When individuals receive rewards that are expected, especially a greater reward than expected, they experience pleasure and emit positive emotions to others, whereas when a person does not receive rewards that are expected, the individual becomes angry and behaves aggressively. Homans also argued that if individuals are over-rewarded by a significant factor, they feel guilty.

More recent theorizing on justice adopts the main elements of Homans's original formulation on distributive justice and adds a number of refinements. Markovsky (1985) argues that calculations of distributive justice revolve around a standard of justice; a comparison process by which actual payoffs and outcomes in an exchange are measured against this justice standard; and a sense of congruity or a discrepancy between outcomes and standards, with discrepancy between payoffs and the justice standards producing negative emotions (and with no discrepancy generating positive emotions). In a similar vein, Jasso (1980, 1990, 1993) argues that justice is a logarithmic function of the ratio between a person's actual share of resources and what this person perceives as just or fair. The relationship is logarithmic because it takes more over-reward than under-reward to generate a sense of injustice. Hence, individuals are more highly attuned to under-rewards than over-rewards. A related finding by Hegtvedt & Killian (1999) is that individuals experience guilt only when they perceive that their rewards and payoffs have negative consequences for the just payoffs to others. Moreover, individuals' justice evaluations are not only influenced by rewards (just, over-, and under-rewards) but also by punishments. Relative to expectations, a smaller amount of punishment generates as much of a sense of injustice as greater amounts of punishment. Thus, the initial punishments exert the most emotional impact on individuals' negative emotional arousal. A final element of Jasso's theory comes back to Homans's concern with comparison processes. Individuals experience positive emotions such as happiness and satisfaction when their payoffs are greater than those given to others. Conversely, they experience negative emotions like anger when their payoffs are less than the rewards of others around them. Power advantage and disadvantage also influence individuals' sense of justice or injustice (Hegtvedt 1990). Those in a power-advantaged position who receive an over-reward are more likely to feel that this outcome is deserved and, as a result, are less likely to express gratitude and related positive emotions to those who have provided the over-reward.

Attribution processes also affect the emotions that individuals experience in exchange relations. Lawler (2001) argues that individuals can make attributions for causes of exchange outcomes to a variety of objects, including task, self, other, and social unit. If attributions for exchange payoffs are attributed to the task, individuals experience pleasantness when task behaviors are profitable and unpleasantness when they are not. If attributions are made to self, individuals experience pride when exchanges are profitable and shame when they are not. If attributions are made to other, gratitude is expressed to those who are seen as the cause of profitable payoffs and anger at others when payoffs are not rewarding. Finally, if attributions are made to the social unit in which exchange occurs, individuals experience affective attachment when payoffs produce positive emotions and affective detachment when they are not.

Attributions, Lawler (2001) argues, reveal a proximal bias, with positive exchange payoffs in negotiated and reciprocal exchanges most likely to be made to self, thus generating feelings of pride. The anger that is aroused from unprofitable

exchanges is most likely to reveal a distal bias and, hence, be attributed to others and, potentially, to the task or the social unit. But in productive exchanges in which individuals must coordinate actions to achieve payoffs, some of the proximal bias can be overcome because individuals cannot separate clearly their contributions to the payoffs, and thus attributions are most likely to be made to the social unit in productive exchanges. As a result, individuals feel affective attachment to the social unit. Given the distal bias for negative outcomes, attributions in productive exchanges are made to the social unit when payoffs are not profitable or are not as profitable as expected, and individuals experience affective detachment or alienation from the social unit. Power-dependence dynamics also influence attributions and emotions. When power-advantaged actors experience justice in exchange relations, they are most likely to make self-attributions and, thereby, experience positive emotions like self-satisfaction and pride toward self (Cook & Hegtvedt 1983, Hegtvedt & Cook 1987, Hegtvedt et al. 1993).

In sum, exchange theory has developed a large set of generalizations on how emotions are effected by exchange processes. These can be summarized as follows:

1. The more that individuals experience profitable exchange payoffs relative to (*a*) assessments of their own costs and investments as well as the costs, investments, and payoffs of others, (*b*) expectation states for payoffs, and (*c*) standards of justice, the more likely they are to experience positive emotions such as satisfaction and happiness; and the more that payoffs exceed expectations and standards of justice, the more likely individuals are eventually to experience guilt, but only under conditions of high over-reward and perceptions that over-rewards cause unjust under-rewards to others.

2. The more that individuals experience profitable exchange payoffs in negotiated and reciprocal exchanges, the more likely that their attributions for the causes behind this outcome will reveal a proximal bias, enabling individuals to experience more intense positive emotions such as pride; the more power-advantaged that individuals are in an exchange relation, the more likely they are to make self-attributions and the less likely they are to experience guilt for high levels of over-reward.

3. The more that individuals fail to receive payoffs proportionate to (*a*) assessments of their own costs and investments compared to the costs and investments of others, (*b*) expectation states for payoffs, and (*c*) the relevant standards of justice, the more likely they are to experience negative emotions such as anger, with such anger emerging more rapidly than positive emotions for profitable exchange payoffs and with attributions for unprofitable payoffs revealing a distal bias and, thus, revealing anger toward others, unpleasantness toward the task, and alienation from the group.

4. The more that an exchange occurs within positively connected and high-density networks involved in cooperation (i.e., productive exchange), the

more likely that individuals will experience profitable exchange payoffs and positive emotions, leading them to make external attributions and to express pleasure and gratitude toward others and affective attachment to the social unit.

5. The more frequently that exchange occurs among individuals, especially when they are mutually dependent on each other for resources, the more likely that positive emotions such as liking, pleasure, satisfaction, interest, and excitement will be experienced and expressed to exchange partners, and the more likely that these partners will develop commitments to the exchange relationship, and, as a result, the more likely that negative emotions such as fear, anxiety, and uncertainty that arise in exchanges will be muted, thereby reducing the costs of exchange and raising net profits for each partner to the exchange.

PROBLEMS IN THEORIES OF HUMAN EMOTIONS

The Relative Neglect of Evolution and Biology

Sociology in general has been reluctant to study the biological bases of human behavior, thought, and action, even in the sociology of emotions where there can be little doubt that human affect has a biological basis, honed like any other biological trait by evolution. Only a few sociologists have ventured into an analysis of the evolutionary forces that have shaped human emotions (for example, Hammond 1990, 2004; Turner 2000; Wentworth & Yardly 1994). As a result, sociologists still hold an overly constructionist view of emotions as the product of culture. Yet, it is clear that there are primary or hard-wired emotions—at a minimum satisfaction-happiness, aversion-fear, assertion-anger, and disappointment-sadness (and perhaps others such as disgust, surprise, anticipation, excitement, and interest). Through processes that are not fully understood, this base of primary emotions is elaborated into complex variants and combinations of emotions (see Kemper 1987, Plutchik 1980, Turner 2000).

It is all too easy to assert that more complex forms of emotions are the product of culture, as many have done, but this assertion is probably wrong. There is a neurological basis for shame, guilt, jealousy, vengeance, pride, sympathy, and other emotions that are built from a few primary emotions (Turner & Stets 2005). Sociological theorizing on emotions cannot ignore this biological basis and the evolutionary forces that selected on hominid and human neuro-anatomy. There can be no doubt, of course, that social structure, culture, and socialization experiences have enormous effects on how particular emotions are expressed, just as humans' innate capacities for language are conditioned by culture, but this does not mean that the capacity for the emotions is purely the product of an emotion culture and socialization into this culture. The fact that the same emotions appear across all human cultures argues for a biological basis that sociologists need to understand. Theorizing in sociology should, therefore, not only try to explain the conditions

under which particular kinds of emotions are aroused, it should also seek to discover why particular emotional capacities exist in the first place.

Emotions and Consciousness

Most sociological theories focus on feelings, or conscious awareness of affect, but in fact, emotions are not always conscious. There is now solid evidence that humans have a subconscious emotional memory system and that the emotions expressed by individuals are not always the same as those they actually feel. Add to this neurological fact the dynamics of repression and other defense mechanisms, and it is clear that sociologists will need to expand theorizing beyond conscious states of feeling to a more general concern with emotions, whether conscious or unconscious. At present, only a few evolutionary approaches (for example, Turner 2000), a couple of psychoanalytic perspectives within symbolic interactionism (for example, Scheff 1988), and one macrostructural theory (Barbalet 1998) appear willing to theorize about the conditions under which emotions are repressed and about the effects of defense mechanisms on behavior, interaction, and social organization.

Emotions and Motivation

Sociologists have been reluctant to conceptualize human motivation beyond some rather simple ideas, such as that humans are motivated to confirm identities; humans are motivated to maintain cognitive consistency; humans are motivated to receive psychic profits in exchanges; humans are motivated to increase levels of emotional energy; and humans are motivated to gain power and prestige. The study of emotions immediately expands this narrow view of human motivation because virtually any emotional state pushes humans to behave in a particular way. The problem with much theoretical work in sociology is that each theory tends to focus on a very narrow range of human emotionality, often positing that certain emotions are more important than others for understanding human motivation and behavior. It may well be that some emotions are especially important for the processes of interest to sociologists, but sociological theories appear to have become focused prematurely.

Some theories address only negative and positive valences that, as a starting point, are a reasonable place to begin, but there are so many varieties of positive and negative emotions, and specific emotions do make a difference in how people behave. Some theories emphasize just a couple emotions—say, pride and shame—as master emotions but, surely, there are more than just these two. Other theories emphasize mild emotions or sentiments, such as liking and disliking or pleasantness and unpleasantness, but these do not capture the full range of emotions. Part of the problem in theorizing is that much research is done on contrived groups among which more intense emotions are difficult to arouse (and if aroused, run into human subject restrictions). As is obvious, strong emotional states such as hatred, vengeance, angst, depression, jealousy, love, and joy drive human behavior, and

these and other strong emotions need to be part of theories that seek to explain human motivation, behavior, and organization.

Emotions and Social Structure

The current theories of emotions focus on a rather limited set of structural properties as influencing emotional arousal: power, status, and perhaps density of networks. These may indeed be key properties deserving of attention by sociologists, but they cannot possibly be the only properties. Moreover, most theories of emotions are microstructural in focus, but surely there are macrodynamic emotional forces. Emotions are distributed across macrostructures. They are the force behind commitments to or disaffection from macrostructures. Emotions are what drive people to tear down macrostructures. They are implicated in all forms of collective behavior. In general, there needs to be much more integration of social psychological theories with those dealing with meso- and macrolevel phenomena. Indeed, theorizing about emotions can provide one way to address the problem of linking micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis. With few exceptions (e.g., Collins 2004, Scheff 1994), sociology of emotion researchers have not done this.

Emotions and Culture

Sociological theories clearly have a cultural bias as evidenced by the heavy emphasis given to emotion ideologies and rules. This bias tends to support a social constructionist view of emotions, with the result that biological forces are underemphasized. Surprisingly, even within the framework of a cultural approach, there has been relatively little analysis of specific emotions and how they are part of the emotion culture. Clark's (1997) analysis of sympathy, for example, is notable for its effort to specify the kinds of cultural rules governing how sympathy is used by individuals. There is a great deal of metaphorical language about emotion ideologies, rules, logics, vocabularies, and the like, but there is surprisingly little theorizing about the connections among these properties of culture and specific emotions, to say nothing of the full array of emotions that humans can experience. Thus, what is true of theories emphasizing the effects of social structure on emotions, and vice versa, is also true of the cultural emphasis. Only a limited range of emotions and cultural forces is studied. Such narrowness is all the more surprising given the social constructionists' belief that the full array of emotional expression is culturally determined.

CONCLUSION

Despite the above points of criticism, the sociology of emotions has made remarkable progress over the past three decades. The working generalizations that we have presented, and the many specific hypotheses that can be generated from these broad generalizations, argue for a considerable potential for cumulative theorizing

in the near future. One possible path in cumulative theory is to develop a more general theory of the forces that increase specific positive emotions—forces such as confirmation of self; profitable exchange payoffs; consistency among cognitions; self-attributions for confirmation of self and profitable exchange payoffs; correspondence between feeling rules and actual feelings; congruence among cognitions about self, other, roles, and situation; rhythmic synchronization of talk and body language; gains in power and prestige; and so on. Conversely, cumulative theory could focus on those forces that increase negative emotional arousal: the converse of all those that are listed above, but perhaps other forces such as the nature of the objects for attributions (self, other, situation, or micro to macro social units) or the effects of repression in intensifying and transmuting emotional responses. Another line of building cumulative theory could come with efforts to specify the cultural and structural conditions under which any or all the processes generating either positive or negative emotions are most likely to be activated. These lines of theoretical synthesis are only a starting point because sociological theorizing will need to explain how specific classes of emotions (beyond positive and negative) are aroused under specific structural and cultural conditions and through specific biological and psychological processes. Thus, for all the progress in understanding emotional dynamics, sociological theorizing on emotions still has a long way to go.

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