发布时间:2019-04-18浏览次数:18
Course Syllabus | |||||||||||
Course code | ECON130064.02 | Compiled date | Dec. 2016 | ||||||||
Course title (Chinese) | 博弈论 | ||||||||||
Course title (English) | Game Theory | ||||||||||
Credits | 3 | Total hours | 54 | ||||||||
Instructor | Ting Li | Department | Department of Economics | ||||||||
Semester | 6th semester | Contact email | liting@fudan.edu.cn | ||||||||
Prerequisite courses | Microeconomics | ||||||||||
Comprehensive □ Fundamental □ Compulsory Elective □ Other □ | |||||||||||
Game theory is the study of multi-person decision problem. Such problems arise frequently in economic fields, for example, industrial organization, international economics, labor and financial economics. This course is designed for undergraduate students who have basic knowledge of Microeconomics and Macroeconomics. It will help them to construct game-theoretic models in applied fields within economics. In order to emphasize the broad scope of the theory, related applications in all fields of economics will be presented. We will discuss four classes of games: static game of complete information, dynamic game of complete information, static game of incomplete information and dynamic game of incomplete information. Corresponding to four classes of games will be four notions of equilibrium: Nash equilibrium, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. | |||||||||||
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NO. | Author | Title | Publisher | Year | |||||||
1 | Robert Gibbons | A Primer in Game Theory | Prentice Hall | 1992 | |||||||
2 | Weiying Zhang | Game Theory and Incentive Theory | Gezhi Press | 2012 | |||||||
3 | Shiyu Xie | Game Theory | Fudan Press | 2008 | |||||||
4 | Drew Fudenburg & Jean Tirole | Game Theory | MIT Press | 1991 | |||||||
5 | Weiying Zhang | Game Theory and the Application | Peking University Press | 2013 | |||||||
6 | Jean Tirole | The Theory of Industrial Organization | MIT Press | 1988 | |||||||
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Chapter | Hour | Contents and key points | Text/ reference | Homework and questions | |||||||
Chapter 1: Static game of complete information | 9 |
| Gibbons (1992) Zhang (2013) | Find the Nash equilibrium | |||||||
Chapter 2: Dynamic game of complete information | 12 |
| Gibbons (1992) Tirole (1988) | 1)Find the subgame-perfect equilibrium 2)Find the conditions under which the trigger strategy could be a SPE | |||||||
Chapter 3: Static game of incomplete information | 12 |
| Gibbons (1992) Fudenburg&Tirole (1991) | Find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium | |||||||
Chapter 4: Dynamic game of incomplete information | 12 |
| Gibbons (1992) Fudenburg&Tirole (1991) | Find the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium | |||||||
Check Forms Check in Homework 20% Midterm exam 30% Final exam 50% Exam form Open-book □Closed-book Other □ | |||||||||||
(The website of network classroomand other websites related to the course are available for students, with auxiliary teaching material. The instructor who has set up the network classroom in the virtual campus, the modern technology education center or in the department's website should make the resources open to the students as more as possible.) The syllabus and assignment can be downloaded from the E-learning. | |||||||||||
Ting LI, Ph.D of Toulouse School of Economics, Assistant Professor of CCES Fudan University. Main field: Industrial Organization Main courses: Microeconomics, Game Theory and Industrial Organization. | |||||||||||
*If the course is provided by several instructors, please indicate the one responsible for the course. |
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